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NOTES
EVIDENCE -ADMISSIBILITY OF LIE DETECTOR TESTS
In the recent Nebraska decision of Boeche v. State' the
defendant was tried and convicted of the crime of uttering and
publishing two forged bank checks. A defense witness, a crim-
inal investigator for the Nebraska Safety Patrol working in the
capacity of polygraph (lie-detector) operator, testified that the
defendant had voluntarily submitted to certain lie-detector
tests. The defendant then offered the witness to testify to and
prove the results of the tests. The trial court sustained an
objection to the competency of such evidence, and the defend-
ant appealed inter alia on the ground of the exclusion of this
evidence. The Supreme Court of Nebraska -upheld the trial
court's ruling, relying on an unbroken line of decisions holding
that "as a matter of law" the results and interpretations of
lie-detector tests are inadmissible as evidence. The concurring
opinion by Justice Chappell, though agreeing with the majority
of the court as to the correctness of the conclusion reached on
the facts in this case, disagreed with that part of the opinion
holding that "as a matter of law" the lie-detector "used for
determining the truthfulness of testimony has not yet gained
such standing and scientific recognition as to justify the admis-
sion of expert testimony deduced from tests made under such
theory."2 This opinion admitted that, on the facts of this case
a sufficient foundation had not been laid to qualify the operator
of the machine as an expert nor to submit the results of the
tests as showing that the defendant was telling the truth when
denying her guilt. But, the concurring opinion concludes, the
results of the lie-detector test upon the defendant should not
be excluded "if a proper foundation is laid whereby it would
be established that the operator was an expert in that field,
and that the apparatus used and the tests made thereunder
have been given general scientific recognition as having efficacy."13
This is the first opinion on an appellate level in which a
justice has expressly favored the admissibility of lie-detector
evidence. It turns the key to the door which, if opened, will
admit a long proposed, but consistently rejected, innovation
1. 37 N.W.2d 593 (Neb. 1949).
2. Id. at 597.
3. Id. at 598.
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into the field of evidence. But the question of the admissibility
of evidence "derived from" lie-detector tests is by no means a
novel one. Text writers have pointed out that such evidence
has been admitted in a number of unreported trial court cases
where a proper foundation had been laid.4 An instance has
been reported in which the results of a lie-detector test were
admitted without objection on the part of the party adversely
affected thereby where, prior to the tests, counsel for both
litigants agreed and stipulated that the results and the testi-
mony of the examiner as to their interpretations could be used
in evidence.5 In an early Wisconsin case such an agreement
was the basis for the admission of test results into evidence.
The tests were given and expert testimony concerning the
interpretation of the results was presented by Mr. Leonarde
Keeler, one of the inventors of the instrument. The pertinent
sections of the stipulation took the following form:
2. That the State of Wisconsin and each of the defendants
hereby waive any objection which they might have to the
admissibility in evidence of the results of such tests and
the methods used in the administering of such tests and
the experience with respect thereto.
3. That evidence so taken may be used by either party to
be considered by the jury, together with all evidence in the
case against each of such defendants upon trial of the
charges against each of them.
5. That in addition to the graphs showing the results of
such tests, it is expressly agreed that said Leonarde Keeler
may testify as an expert as to the conclusions reached by
him in the interpretations of such graphs.6
Where admissions and confessions were obtained in conse-
quence of the use of lie-detectors, the courts have rejected any
objection to the use of the instrument as a means of inducing
such admissions and confessions.7
The opinion of Mr. Justice Chappell in the principal case
relies heavily on the only other reported case favoring the
admissibility of lie-detector evidence, People v. Kenny. Though
4. See Note, [1943] Wis. L. REV. 430.
5. 26 J. CRim. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 262-270 (1935).
6. State v. Loniello and Grignano, an unreported trial court case dis-
cussed in 26 J. CnIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 262 (1935).
7. Commonwealth v. Hipple, 3 A.2d 353 (Pa. 1939); Commonwealth v.Jones, 19 A.2d 389 (Pa. 1941); De Hart v. State, 8 N.W.2d 360 (Wis.
1943).8. 167 Misc. 51, 3 N.Y.S.2d 348 (County Court 1938). It should be noted
that this was a trial court decision which never reached an appellate juris-
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other cases have intimated that such evidence might have been
admitted had a "proper foundation" been established these
scattered decisions could hardly be regarded as a precedent or
stepping stone toward the result which this opinion advocates.9
The Kenny case is an unusual one, not only in that it is the
only reported case in which polygraph evidence was actually
admitted, and further, was a substantial factor in securing the
conviction of the defendant, but also in that the controversial
"proper foundation" which was laid in the case was of such
nature that, if used as a norm, it would defeat the practicality
of the use of lie-detectors in obtaining evidence which could
be admitted at the trial stage. The court in that case overruled
the defendant's objection to the admission of the evidence after
the State had established the following: (1) that the witness-
examiner was head of the Department of Psychology of the
Graduate School of Fordham University and that his education
included a doctorate in both physics and philosophy; (2) that
the witness had been a professor of Psychology at a medical
school for several years, and that he had undertaken extensive
research and private study in Europe; (3) that, basing his
opinion on his vast experience, the witness claimed scientific
accuracy and reliability for the testing apparatus and tests
resulting therefrom, and that this conclusion was further
based on a study which covered more than 6,000 tests; (4) that
the witness expressed a firm conviction, based upon evidence
and investigations, that the tests, when properly employed upon
those actually charged with crime, would prove 100 per cent
efficient and accurate in the detection of deception. 10 If, in
any given jurisdiction, polygraph evidence were not excluded
as a matter of law, but the courts were willing to admit such
evidence if a "proper foundation" had been laid, then surely
the facts established in the Kenny case would adequately meet
the requirements of a proper foundation. A better qualified
expert could not have been found. On the other hand, if that
same jurisdiction were to hold that the Kenny case had set a
standard, a minimum requirement, for the admission of such
diction. See 16 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rnv. 202 (1938) for criticism of People
v. Kenny.
9. See People v. Forte, 279 N.Y. 204, 18 N.E.2d 31 (1938); People v.
Becker, 300 Mich. 562, 2 N.W.2d 503 (1942).
10. People v. Kenny, 167 Misc. 51, 3 N.Y.S.2d 348 (County Court 1938).
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
evidence, then the use of polygraph tests for evidentiary pur-
poses would become almost prohibitory. The number of poly-
graph operators who would be able to qualify as experts is
too small and the cost of obtaining such experts for the purpose
of supervising the examinations and testifying to the results
would be too high to make the use of the polygraph practical.
Nearly all of the polygraph operators are merely trained tech-
nicians who are familiar with the functions of the instrument
and are able to apply their knowledge and skill to obtain the
maximum efficiency. The operator for the Nebraska Safety
Patrol whose testimony was offered in the Boeche case is the
type of witness which, if regarded as a qualified expert in that
field, would solve the problem that Justice Chappell's opinion
has left unanswered.
An examination of the other reported cases indicates an
almost dogmatic objection to the use of lie-detector evidence.
Why have the courts consistently rejected this type of scientific
evidence when they have been willing to accept the testimony
of experts in the fields of psychiatry, ballistics, handwriting
analysis, x-rays, and others too numerous to mention? An
unequivocal answer to this question might enable the legal
profession to find a solution to the problem of laying a "proper
foundation" for the admission of such evidence. But the an-
swers which some of the courts have given have merely been
a form of "begging the question." Shortly after the Kenny
case the New York Court of Appeals handed down a decision
refusing the admission in evidence of the results of polygraph
tests.1 The decision does not reveal an intention by the court
to overrule the result of the Kenny case. 2 But, the court
states, it could not, in the absence of a competent foundation,
take judicial notice that the lie-detector did or did not possess
such general scientific recognition as to justify the admission
of testimony deduced from tests made. Four years later the
Supreme Court of Michigan in an opinion upholding the ex-
clusion of lie-detector evidence, stated that, had a "proper
foundation" been laid, the problem would have received greater
consideration from them and possible recognition of such
evidence.13
11. People v. Forte, 279 N.Y. 204, 18 N.E.2d 31 (1938).
12. See Note, 139 A.L.R. 1174 (1942).
13. People v. Becker, 300 Mich. 562, 2 N.W.2d 503 (1942).
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A thorough review of all cases since the earliest decision in
Frye v. United States" reveals that none but the already cited
decisions have as much as permitted any variations from the
established doctrine of the inadmissibility of lie-detector evi-
dence. In Frye v. United States, decided in the District of
Columbia more than a quarter of a century ago, expert testi-
mony explaining systolic blood pressure deception tests was
excluded on the ground that this type of scientific evidence had
not yet been sufficiently established to gain general acceptance
in the field in which it belongs. In State v. Bohner,5 ten years
later, the offer of lie-detector evidence was again refused, the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin relying almost exclusively on the
decision in the Frye case. This result was obtained in spite
of the fact that the expert witness was Prof. Leonarde Keeler,
the leading authority in the field of lie-detection, who was ready
to offer testimony as to the substantial accuracy of the ap-
paratus. The court felt that the instrument had not yet pro-
gressed from the experimental to the demonstrable stage. The
same result was reached by the same court in 1943, stating no
further grounds than the authority of its previous decision."6
The Supreme Court of Missouri in 1945 joined the ranks of
opponents to the use of lie-detectors for the purpose of pro-
ducing evidence, basing its decision primarily on precedent and
further stating that although the lie-detector may be useful
in the investigation of crime, and may point to evidence which
is competent, "it has no place in the court room."'7  By 1947
scientific advancements and improvements had apparently not
yet overcome the effect of the shadow which the 1923 decision
had cast upon this type of scientific evidence. In State v.
Lowry ' a trial court verdict was reversed on the ground that
it was prejudicial to permit lie-detector evidence to be weighed
by the jury in determining the guilt or innocence of the de-
fendant. The court based its objection on the fact that the
"practical effect of the admission of this testimony was to
constitute a mechanical device * * * a sort of witness in
absentia on the question of the defendant's guilt or innocence." 9
14. 54 App. D.C. 46, 293 Fed. 1013 (1923).
15. 210 Wis. 651, 246 N.W. 314 (1933).
16. La Fevre v. State, 242 Wis. 416, 8 N.W.2d 288 (1943).
17. State v. Cole, 354 Mo. 181, 188 S.W.2d 43 (1945).
18. State v. Lowry, 163 Kan. 622, 185 P.2d 147 (1947).
19. Id. at 627, 185 P.2d at 150.
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The court felt that such testimony, if permitted, would impair
the vital function of cross examination. But it is apparent that
the court found a welcome crutch in the long line of decisions
cited above, from which it did not seem willing to depart.
"We are not ready to say that the lie-detector has attained
such scientific and psychological accuracy . . ." or words to
that effect have become almost standardized dicta in the de-
cisions of the past twenty-seven years. The overwhelming
majority of courts have closed their eyes and ears to the
admissibility of lie-detector evidence.
In the light of these decisions, what solution may be sug-
gested to the problem of laying a foundation for the admission
of lie-detector evidence? The Kenny case offers one possible
answer. But, as has been pointed out, the application of the
standards set in that case would make the use of the lie-
detector impractical in the field of evidence. On the other hand,
courts will not permit this type of evidence unless it can be
clearly proved to them that the test results are accurate and
that its operator has the scientific background and the tech-
nological ability accurately to interpret the instrument. The
Boecke case is significant in that the concurring judge advo-
cates the admission of lie-detector evidence if the witness
through whom the testimony is offered is properly qualified
as a polygraph operator. This is an implied indication that
he had enough confidence in the instrument itself to have
accepted its results if the other requirements had been met.
There is no doubt that the stringency of the requirements for
a "proper foundation" will vary inversely with the degree of
acceptance the instrument itself has gained as one of scientific
and psychological accuracy.
No doubt, the day has not yet arrived on which the polygraph
is to take its place among the many other scientific devices
which are playing so important a role in the proper admin-
istration of justice. But there are steps which may be taken
to hasten that day, to strengthen the small foothold which
such decisions as the Kenny case and the Boeche case have
given the polygraph in the field of evidence. While the scien-
tists and technical experts are developing new improvements
and increasing the efficiency of the instrument, its legal advo-
cates can devise new methods and techniques of impressing
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upon the courts not only the tremendous advances which have
been made in the science of lie-detection but also the great
social and practical value which may be derived from its ap-
plication for the purpose of obtaining evidence admissible at
the trial stage. In criminal cases both the prosecution and
the defense have sought to apply lie-detector evidence. In
State v. Loniello and Grignano02 the parties were successful in
their attempt to do so by a stipulation for admission of the
evidence prior to the taking of the tests.2 This is an ample
indication that the parties to an action have recognized the
value as evidence of the results of lie-detector tests. One of
the major barriers to the admission of such evidence has been
the lack of availability of experts whom the courts will recog-
nize as qualified to give the tests and testify to the results.
This barrier could probably be overcome if the appropriate
departments of the states would undertake to give special
training to qualified persons and license them as operators.
Surely the courts would not then require the witness to be a
leading authority in the fields of psychiatry and physiology in
addition to being an expert in the operation of lie-detectors.
Compilations of data showing the high percentage of
accuracy of these tests should be available and discretion should
be used in applying the tests only to those subjects where
accurate results can be obtained. Once the basic objections to
the use of lie-detector evidence, as brought out by the decisions
cited in this note, have been overcome and such evidence is
admitted by the courts for some purposes, then the "foothold"
will have become sufficiently secure to establish the polygraph
as one of the scientific devices in the field of evidence whose
universal application will be justified. Mr. Inbau, a noted
authority on scientific He-detection, clearly summarized this
conclusion by stating that "in due course of time, . . . the
judiciary will absorb it [lie-detector evidence] as it has ac-
cepted other scientific developments-but not without the same
degree of caution. '2
SAMUEL A. GOLDBLATT.
20. See note 6 supra.
21. 26 J. CRIM. L. & CRMINoLoGy 262-270 (1935).
22. Ibid.
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